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RESPONSE TO APPELLEES' ARGUMENT 
I. THIS COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO DECIDE THE INTERPRETATION AND 
INTENT OF THE LEGISLATURE REGARDING THE DEFINED TERMS 
"HOUSEHOLD" AND "DOMICILE" AS THEY PERTAIN TO THE GRANTING 
OF TWO PRIMARY RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY TAX EXEMPTIONS TO THE 
SCOTT FAMILY. 
Appellees' claim that the "Tax Commission did not reach the 
issue of two primary residences, but found based on the limited 
evidence for the residence of Mrs. Scott and the children that it 
was possible their primary residence was also Park City." (Brief 
of Appellee Bradley & Jillian Scott, pp. 4). Consequently, the 
Appellees assert that this Court lacks jurisdiction over the 
issue of whether or not a family can be two households for 
purposes of the primary residential property tax exemption. (Id. 
at 9-13). This is an absurd position given the County's argument 
at the Tax Commission and the Tax Commission's reasoning it 
utilized in making its decision. 
The Tax Commission stated in its Findings of Fact that 
In 2001, the Summit County assessor and the 
Salt Lake County assessor discussed whether 
both of the Scott's Utah homes, i.e., the 
subject property and the Salt Lake home, 
qualified to receive the primary residential 
exemption. Both homes had received the 
primary residential exemption in the 2000 tax 
year. Based on the information available to 
the two county assessors, the Salt Lake 
County assessor decided that the Salt Lake 
home qualified for the exemption. For this 
reason, the Summit County assessor removed 
the exemption from the subject property so 
that the Scott "household" did not receive 
more than one primary residential exemption. 
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The Summit County Board of Equalization 
sustained the assessor's action. 
(Brief of the Appellant Summit County, Addendum E, pp. 
3)(emphasis added). Clearly, the Tax Commission understood the 
issue raised by Summit County that one "household," which is one 
family, was entitled to only one primary residential property tax 
exemption. In fact, in the section of the Tax Commission's Order 
entitled, "Applicable Law," the Tax Commission noted that Utah 
Administrative Rule 884-24-52 provides that "the residential 
exemption . . . is limited to one primary residence per 
household." (Id. at 8)(emphasis added). In the Tax Commission's 
historical practice, it had clearly stated that allowing a 
husband and wife to have separate primary residences would 
"thwart the intent of the statute," and thus the intent of the 
Utah Legislature with respect to the primary residential property 
tax exemption. Hadley v. County Board of Equalization of 
Washington County, Appeal No.. 94-2128 (Tax Commission 1994) (See 
Brief of the Appellant Summit County, Addendum H). As such, the 
County's argument concerning the Scotts was not a new issue to 
the Tax Commission. In point of fact, Summit County was simply 
using the historical arguments normally espoused by the Tax 
Commission itself. 
It is at this point in its Order that the Tax Commission 
starts mixing and matching the defined terms "domicile" and 
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"household," and ultimately upholds its 2002 monumental change to 
the historical interpretation of the statute defining 
"household." Although the Tax Commission stated in the Order 
that its decision was limited to the Park City home, and 
specifically did not address the "domicile" of the wife and 
children, the Tax Commission could not logically have reached the 
underlying conclusion that the Park City home was entitled to the 
primary residential property tax exemption without also 
determining that the Scott Family constituted two separate and 
distinct households. The Commission had already noted in its 
Findings of Fact that the Salt Lake home had a primary 
residential property tax exemption. In sum, the Tax Commission 
cannot divest this Court of jurisdiction by a simple play on 
words because it does not want its 2002 reversal of 
interpretation of statute to be reviewed by this Court. This 
Court is entitled to an opportunity to evaluate the reasoning 
used by the Tax Commission in finding that one family may 
constitute two separate households for purposes of the primary 
residential property tax exemption. 
II. SUMMIT COUNTY HAS CONTINUING STANDING TO RAISE THE ISSUE 
REGARDING THE INTERPRETATION OF "HOUSEHOLD" AND "DOMICILE" 
BECAUSE SUCH INTERPRETATIONS DIRECTLY IMPACT THE TAX 
REVENUES OF SUMMIT COUNTY WITH REFERENCE TO ALL SECOND 
HOMEOWNERS. 
Appellees again make an absurd argument that Summit County 
does not have standing to bring this Appeal because the issues 
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raised by the County do not impact their tax revenues and hence, 
"the County has no stake in those issues." (Brief of Appellee 
Bradley & Jillian Scott, pp., 13) . 
In fact, if the County is correct in its interpretation of 
the statute, then the Salt Lake home, as agreed to by the county 
assessors, would claim the primary exemption and Summit County 
would be entitled to the full property tax on the Park City home, 
thus impacting the County's revenues directly.. (Brief of 
Appellant Summit County, Addendum E, pp. 3). 
By the same token, if the Tax Commission's ruling in the 
Scott case stands, Summit County may lose hundreds of thousands 
of dollars in tax revenue from second homeowners who would claim 
their second homes as primary residences because they too have 
family members who spend time at those second homes during the 
calendar year. Summit County has one of the largest second home 
communities in the State of Utah. The fact is, this decision of 
the Tax Commission opens up Pandora's box with respect to the 
proliferation of primary residential property tax exemptions and 
could lead to a major tax shift among full-time residents in 
Summit County. 
Consequently, Summit County has a rather large stake in the 
outcome of this case and the Tax Commission's interpretation of 
"household." 
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III. THE TAX COMMISSION HAS THWARTED THE INTENT OF THE 
LEGISLATURE WITH RESPECT TO THE INTERPRETATION OF 
"HOUSEHOLD" AND "DOMICILE" IN GRANTING TWO PRIMARY 
RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY TAX EXEMPTIONS TO ONE FAMILY, 
Appellees' acknowledge that Hadley clearly holds the 
opposite of what the Tax Commission decided in the case sub 
judice. (Brief of Appellee Bradley & Jillian Scott, pp. 17). 
However, Appellees go on to state that "[t]imes change, however, 
as society and finally the law recognize the increasing 
independence of individuals even within intact families." (Id.) 
Consequently, Appellees seem be to arguing that the Tax 
Commission, as an agency of the Executive Branch of government, 
has the authority to change the law and public policy to adapt to 
"changing times." However, this reasoning clearly violates the 
doctrine of separation of powers. It is the Utah Legislature, 
not an executive branch agency, who makes public policy and 
enacts laws. In Hadley, the Tax Commission acknowledged that the 
intent of the Legislature was for a family to be one household 
for purposes of the primary residential property tax exemption. 
Hadley, Appeal No. 94-2128, pp. 11-12. 
For the Tax Commission to unilaterally change the law and 
its legislative intent without warning or notice to any of the 
taxing entities flies in the face of established precedence by 
the Utah Supreme Court. In Husky Oil Company v. Tax Commission, 
556 P.2d 1268 (Utah 1976), the Tax Commission promulgated and 
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applied an administrative rule from 1937 until 1971, when it 
amended the rule without any impetus from the legislature or the 
courts. The Utah Supreme Court analyzed whether the 1971 
amendment should be applied to a taxpayer and stated that 
prior determinations are entitled to great 
weight . . . and radical departures from 
administrative interpretation consistently 
followed cannot be made except for most 
cogent reasons. 
Husky Oil Company, 556 P.2d at 1271. The Court then struck down 
the 1971 amendment for the reason that "[t]he Commission has made 
radical departures from an interpretation unchangingly followed 
by it for more than three decades" and "does not infuse cogency 
into the reasons for those departures." Id. 
Here, the Tax Commission changed its long standing 
interpretation of "household," which mirrored the legislative 
intent referred to in Hadley, in 2002 to allow for one family to 
be multiple "households" for purposes of the primary property tax 
exemption. Such a radical departure from established 
interpretation came without input from the legislature or courts, 
nor even any input from the taxing entities on how such a new 
interpretation would effect the continuity of tax policy in their 
geographical areas. This Court should follow the precedence of 
the Utah Supreme Court in striking down the Tax Commission's new 
interpretations of "household" for purposes of the primary 
residential property tax exemption. 
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IV. THE TAX COMMISSION'S HISTORICAL INTERPRETATIONS OF 
"HOUSEHOLD" AND "DOMICILE" ARE NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 
Appellees argument on pages 19 and 20 of their brief is a 
half hearted attempt to elevate the Tax Commission's new 
statutory interpretations to the status of constitutional law. 
This is also absurd. 
The issues surrounding primary and secondary residential 
property taxes and the Constitution were dealt with by the Utah 
Supreme Court in Dennis v. Summit County, 933 P.2d 387 (Utah 
1997) . 
Finally, Appellees assert a "possible" constitutional claim 
based upon the equal protection provisions of the 14th amendment. 
This claim asserts that interpreting the tax laws in their 
historical fashion would prevent "an individual from establishing 
a residence/' (Appellee Bradley & Jillian Scott Brief at p. 19), 
and promotes divorces and separation in order to receive a double 
primary residential property tax exemption. Id. This claim is 
illusory, without merit and without any legal support. In fact, 
courts have repeatedly rejected similar equal protection claims 
regarding the "marriage penalty" under federal income tax 
regulations. Drucker v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 697 
F.2d 46 (2nd Cir. 1982); See also Penden v. State, 930 P.2d 1 
(Kan. 1996); Rinier v. State, 641 A.2d 276 (N.J. 1994). 
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Further, the Tax Commission's historical interpretation of 
"household" treated all persons, married or otherwise, similarly. 
Decisions of the Tax Commission did not determine "household" as 
married persons only, in fact, it included un-married, but co-
habitating persons as well. Black v. Board of Equalization of 
Salt Lake County, Appeal No. 02-0598 (Utah Tax Commission 2002) . 
The Tax Commission did not historically grant two (2) primary 
residential exemptions to co-habitating persons any more than to 
married persons and the Appellees have failed to cite any support 
for this "possible" contention. Whether a tax payer was single, 
separated, divorced married or co-habitating, the question of 
"domicile" and "household" was until recently, interpreted the 
same way and there is no evidence that the historical 
interpretation created any disparate treatment or has had a 
chilling effect on the institution of marriage or a detrimental 
effect on families. 
« 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant Summit County requests this Court reinstate the 
intent of the Utah State Legislature in granting only one primary 
residential property tax exemption per family unit, which is by 
definition one household. 
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